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on take-up rates and average annual amounts at the end of each fiscal year, and a program 
review of the Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Bonus (FLPB) Program. An 
understanding of the policies and take-up rates for the various special and incentive pays 
during this period can assist the Marine Corps in implementing and updating policies that 
target the intended population group for hard-to-fill assignments and retention in specific 
military occupational specialties (MOSs). The program review on the FLPB explains how 
the changes in the pay incentive policy can affect the performance of the eligible population 
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The purpose of this thesis is to provide a detailed summary and analysis on all 
available bonus and incentive pay programs the Marine Corps has offered since 2000. The 
research in this area is important to military manpower and personnel for two reasons. First, 
the Marine Corps implemented the Blended Retirement System (BRS) as an option for 
Marines with less than 12 years of active duty service as 1 January 2018 to take in lieu of 
the legacy retirement system. The legacy retirement system provided Marines with a built-
in incentive to serve for a duration of 20 years (the vesting period) in order to receive 
retirement compensation through a defined benefit plan. Analyzing the responsiveness of 
Marines who took advantage of available bonus and pay incentive programs since 2000 
will provide the Marine Corps with useful information for understanding ways to 
effectively use bonus and special pay programs to influence the behavior of Marines under 
the BRS. Studies regarding the BRS suggest that the Marine Corps may face challenges 
with retention on active duty at the 12-year to 16-year mark of service if the organization 
does not effectively incentivize Marines at stay or leave decision points in their careers.  
Second, with the vision and strategy for the Force of the Future 2025, the Marine 
Corps is changing its organizational structure to meet a demand for an advanced 
technological force, causing a change to manpower requirements. As a result, the Marine 
Corps may have to develop new or restructure additional pay incentive programs as a force-
shaping tool in order to maintain healthy manpower levels in critical military occupational 
specialty (MOS) categories. For example, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) may 
need to introduce a new special bonus program at re-enlistment periods for the cyber 
community in order to maintain healthy levels in the MOS as well as each rank. In addition, 
pay incentives may be necessary to maintain a specific number of officers beyond their 
service obligation in the cyber security community who have technical and valuable 
experience. In order for a Marine to decide to remain in service, the marginal utility for 
remaining on active duty must be greater than the marginal utility for taking civilian 
employment. A historical assessment of how Marines have responded to existing pay 
incentives in the past will provide the Marine Corps with a better understanding of how 
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much or how little they should invest in incentivizing Marines to remain in service through 
monetary means. 
(1) Methodology 
I provide a qualitative and quantitative analysis detailing how the different pay 
incentives in the Marine Corps have changed through time and identify the “take-up rate” 
of the eligible Marine population in each of the separate pay incentive categories. I define 
the “take-up rate” in this analysis as the percentage of the eligible population who took 
advantage of a particular pay incentive or special pay.  
The qualitative portion of the analysis covers a holistic overview of existing 
economic theory associated with pay incentives in defense manpower. The literature 
review regarding military compensation in the form of bonus and special pay incentives 
also includes published studies from both RAND and the Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA). Some of the published studies on the effects of special pays on re-enlistment rates 
used data from Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) for all services. Two examples 
for such recent studies estimating the responsiveness of service members to changes in 
monetary compensations include the following: 
• Cost Benefit Analysis of Lump Sum Bonuses for Zone A, Zone B, and Zone 
C (Hattiagandi et al., 2004), which analyzes the effect of lump sum 
bonuses on the probability of Marines reenlisting. The Marine Corps 
switched from a periodic payment plan system for the SRB to a lump sum. 
The study finds a significant effect of the SRB on the rate of reenlistment 
in each zone. However, the authors claim to have overestimated the effect 
using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. 
• Developing the Navy Reserve’s Language and Culture Pilot Program 
(Moskowitz et al., 2010) outlines the findings of a study on 168 enlisted 
discussion group participants. The majority were supportive of the use of 
monetary incentives to promote language skills and cultural awareness. 
However, some personnel expressed their concerns of the program, such 
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as the threat of it being a waste of time for reservists if their newly 
acquired language skills were not put to use. 
The second portion of the qualitative analysis categorizes, summarizes, and tracks 
the various pay incentives using references such as the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Instructions, Marine Corps Orders (MCOs), and Marine Administrative Messages 
(MARADMINs) and identifies how the programs have changed from 2000 to 2017. It 
tracks the changes to the pay tables for many of the special pay incentives that have been 
available to the public since 2000. The thesis organizes 15 different pay incentives in three 
major special pay categories: incentives targeting retention through assignment, incentives 
targeting retention through special skills, and incentives targeting participation.  
Incentives targeting retention through assignment include Aviation Career 
Incentive Pay (ACIP), Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP), Fly Duty Pay, Overseas Extension 
Pay, and Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP). Incentives targeting retention through 
special skills are Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP), Career Status Bonus (CSB), Critical 
Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), Enlisted Bonus Program (EBP), Foreign Language 
Proficiency Pay Bonus (FLPB), and Selective Retention Bonus (SRB). Incentives targeting 
participation include Acceleration Duty (ACCEL) Pay, Additional Uniform Allowance, 
Assisted Living Allowance, and Hostile Fire Pay (HFP). The comprehensive description 
of the changes to policies in each category can serve as supporting documentation for future 
Marine Corps pay incentive studies involving the econometric analysis of pay elasticities 
in each of the incentive categories.  
The quantitative part of the analysis uses pay and foreign language data from the 
Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps and DMDC end 
strength totals from 2000 to 2017. The pay data from TFDW is a snapshot of the entire 
Marine Corps population on September 30 of each fiscal year who took advantage of at 
least one of the 15 special pay incentives categorized in the thesis. The first section in the 
quantitative analysis explains the take-up rate for each of the special incentive pay 
categories for each fiscal year. The second section provides a program review for the FLPB 
and measures to what extent the incentive pay influenced the performance of the eligible 
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Marine population on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) using regression 
analysis.  
Few studies have been done on the FLPB program in the other services. In the 
Marine Corps, there is also a lack of literature on the how many Marines have taken the 
test to qualify each year and how many of them received the incentive. In order to receive 
the FLPB, Marines must qualify on DLPT annually. Their scores on the certification test 
and the identification of the language as “Immediate or Emerging” on the annual 
MARADMIN determine the pay schedule that is applicable to their score and language-
identification combination (Category A). The maximum rate under the current policy is 
$12,000 per year ($500 per month). The Department of Defense determines the language 
list in Category A, and it sets the rates for Schedule 1 payments (higher rates) for 
“Immediate” and “Emerging” languages. However, the Marine Corps has the ability to 
determine the rates for the languages it designates in Category B as “Enduring” under the 
Schedule 2 payments (lower rates). The Marine Corps also controls a separate list of 
languages eligible for Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 rates based on strategic capability.  
The most recent policy for FLPB is MCO 7220.52F signed on 27 September 2016. 
The current order canceled the previous policy, MCO 7220.52E signed on 6 June 2006, 
and made numerous changes regarding eligibility of Marines for the incentive. Various 
MARADMINs throughout the years provided updates to which languages qualify for each 
level of pay incentive. The list of languages and associated pay entitlements vary from year 
to year due to changes in strategic policy. Although the list is not readily available to the 
public, I will provide insight to how effective the pay incentive has been to the eligible 
Marine population for the last 17 years. 
(2) Research Questions and Findings 
The analysis answers two primary questions: 
1. What bonus pay and incentive pay programs have been available to 
Marines since 2000? 
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2. Of the eligible Marine population, what percentage of Marines took 
advantage of the bonus pay and incentive pay programs since 2000? 
The thesis also answers one secondary question: 
1. Using the Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus Program (FLPB) as a case 
study, to what extent has the FLPB influenced the performance of the 
eligible Marine population on the DLPT?  
The policy and data analysis suggest the following: 
• The take-up rate for incentives targeting retention through assignment 
decreased significantly for the aviation community since the drawdown, 
but the take-up rate has increased gradually for overseas extensions and 
SDAs for the last decade. 
• The take-up rate for incentives targeting retention for Marines who have 
special skills have declined significantly since the drawdown except for 
FLPB. 
• There is a small percentage of Marines who qualify for FLPB each year, 
but the take-up rate among the Marines from all language sources (home 
environment, military school source, and civilian school source) has 
increased from 2008 to 2017. 
• The percentage of Marines from a military school source who are 
performing well on the DLPT increased from 2008 to 2017, while the 
percentage of Marines from the home environment decreased for the same 
period. However, at the margin, the school trained Marines still do not 
perform as well on the DLPT as Marines from a home environment or 
civilian institution. 
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• The average increase in the FLPB from 2008 to 2017 could be correlated 
to the large increase in the percentage of Marines from a military source 
who are performing better on the DLPT.  
The results of the analysis led to three recommendations the Marine Corps could 
use to improve efficiencies and gain return of on investment in the FLPB program:  
• Allow flexibility in the policy for FAO and FAS to allow for a specialized 
track for Marines to increase the time they spend immersed in the assigned 
language and optimize the return of investment in the FLPB program. 
• Consider and track the placement of Marines with specific language skills 
to SDA such as recruiting and Marine Security Guard MSG duty as a way 
to increase the return of investment in the FLPB program.  
• Develop an off the shelf plan for the CSRB program prior to experiencing 
any potential shortages as a result of the BRS. I recommend varying pay 
levels among Marine populations identified and forecasted to show the 
projected shortages. I also recommend examining the wage differentials 
between the civilian and military sector in those occupations. 
Overall, my thesis provides the Marine Corps with a summary of the different pay 
incentives that the service controls and identifies the ways they have changed within the 
last 17 years. The analysis gives the Marine Corps an estimate of how many Marines took 
advantage of the different pay incentive programs at the end of each fiscal year for the last 
17 years. Finally, the program review of the FLPB provides the Marine Corps with a 
comprehensive analysis on one special pay category, and it can help the service improve 
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I. ECONOMIC THEORY  
The end of conscription and the implementation of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) 
in July 1973 was a demand signal for the United States military to employ marketing 
strategies to attract, retain, and promote qualified personnel to serve in the armed forces. 
Major policy changes like the AVF and the recent change from the legacy retirement 
system to the Blended Retirement System (BRS) in January 2018 serve as “random shocks” 
to military’s system of retention. Since the early 1980s, economists from the private and 
public sector published numerous studies related to military compensation and the 
estimated the effects of different levels of compensation on retention in the services. This 
chapter summarizes some of these studies and categorizes them into two main areas in 
defense economic theory: labor demand in an AVF and bonus programs and incentives. A 
thorough review of the economic theory and its application to bonus programs can enhance 
the Marine Corps’ ability to maintain quality of personnel, use pay incentives efficiently, 
and increase operational capability.  
A. LABOR DEMAND IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
The National Security Strategy and the Marine Corps mission as defined in the 
National Defense Strategy shapes the demand for labor in the service. The Marine Corps 
publishes the demand for labor for each fiscal year in the Table of Organization (T/O), 
accessible through the Total Force Management System (TFSMS). Unlike in the civilian 
competitive labor market where compensation is set at the market wage rate, the Marine 
Corps manages manpower in a resource constrained environment with statutory limitations 
on military compensation. For example, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee 
published the summary to the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that 
“authorizes $134 billion for military personnel, including costs of pay, allowances, 
bonuses, death benefits, and permanent change of station moves.” The law also 
“reauthorizes over 30 types of bonuses and special pays aimed at encouraging enlistment, 
reenlistment, and continued service by active duty and reserve component military 
personnel” (McCain & Reed, 2017). The NDAA not only restricts base pay for Marine 
 2 
Corps personnel, but it also restricts the types and amounts of bonuses that the service can 
use as incentives to retain personnel. The challenges to the manpower process with 
statutory limitations on military compensation are apparent when the Marine Corps 
demands high-quality personnel with a specific mix of skills to maintain operational 
capabilities in a dynamic environment. The September 2016 Marine Corps Operating 
Concept (MOC) states that  
Our ability to successfully execute the concept will depend greatly on the 
extent to which we have designed and implemented manpower systems, 
policies, processes to attract, develop, retain, and support highly qualified 
Marines and civilian employees prepared for the rigors of 21st century 
expeditionary operations—because we are in a fight for the best and the 
brightest talent. (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2016, 
p. 9) 
How well the Marine Corps manages various incentive pay and bonus programs to 
attract and maintain talented personnel will affect how quickly the organization can adapt 
to a changing operational environment with new requirements. 
1. Managing Incentives in a Total Force Structure 
In Volume 2 of the Handbook of Defense Military Economics, economists 
summarize updates to the economic theory behind the challenges manpower managers face 
in the post-Cold War Era. The authors note that U.S. force managers need increased 
capability to manage the force in a fluid, dynamic environment, but are often constrained 
by outmoded “legacy” systems and personnel practices that inhibit movement toward more 
efficient force mixes (Asch, Hosek, & Warner, 2007, p. 1105). The authors claim that an 
increase in technological advancements decreases the need for manpower in certain 
occupations in the military. However, the technological advancements have also increased 
the requirement for services to attract and retain personnel who have high quality, 
experience, and special skills.  
Incentives matter with the assignment of personnel to areas that may be viewed as 
less desirable. In 2003, the Navy began exploring the internet auction as a way to set the 
Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) rates for select overseas locations. Normally, assignments 
targeted with AIP are usually hard-to-fill billets at locations designated by each service 
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department. In the same year, the Navy implemented the internet auction so that sailors 
could submit bids for different locations in an attempt to set the AIP rate by using the 
market (Asch, Hosek, & Warner, 2007, p. 1111). The auction site for AIP allowed the Navy 
to set the rate by the first or second marginal bid. Preliminary indications from the 
implementation showed that it was effective, but other services were resistant to use a 
market-based incentive to set the rate for AIP. Since AIP affects a small percentage of all 
of the services’ population combined, the success of a market rate based incentive could 
serve as a cost-effective way to structure AIP programs across the services.  
CNA conducted several studies in order to explore innovative ways to manage 
retention in high-demand billets and assignments. Officer Off-On Ramps (Parcel, 2007), 
addresses the Navy’s interest in officer off-on ramps as an option to manage the total force 
and fill billets. An off-on ramp allows an officer to leave active duty and return to active 
duty at some point in time, and the officer would be able to continue serving upon return 
without a negative impact from the sabbatical on career progression. At the time, the 
retention of female officers in the Surface Warfare officer (SWO) community was of 
concern, and policies such as the Career Intermission Pilot Program were under review in 
attempt to address the retention issue.  
The study finds a correlation between overall community retention in the SWO 
community with increases in retention bonuses, but the retention gap between males and 
females is the community did not diminish with an increase of the bonus (Parcell, 2007, 
p. 46). The study suggests that the stay or leave decisions the females were making would 
not translate well into retention policies because the two reasons they cited most were 
morale and difficulty achieving the work/life balance (p. 45). The available bonuses were 
not enough to incentivize more female officers to remain on active duty between 4 and 12 
years of service. The on-off ramp was an attempt to address the balance between work and 
life by giving members an option to leave and return to active duty without a negative 
impact on career advancement. 
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2. Re-evaluation of Incentives for Future Retention 
In response to the change in the retirement policy in January 2018 from the legacy 
system to the Blended Retirement System (BRS), RAND published a study regarding the 
effects of the new policy on retention across the services. Continuation pay, a component 
of the BRS, is supposed to “sustain the size and experience mix of the force by providing 
a retention incentive to those in their mid-careers to offset the reduction in retention 
incentives caused by the reduced DB multiplier (Asch, Hosek, & Maddock, 2017, p. 6).” 
They used the dynamic retention model (DRM) to estimate the effects of the continuation 
pay on retention in the Marine Corps without the higher defined benefit multiplier at the 
end of the 20-year vesting period.  
The results suggest that a higher continuation pay multiplier for officers over 
enlisted may be necessary to maintain healthy forces levels among officers under the BRS 
in the steady state. Furthermore, “Additional special and incentive pays would be needed 
to sustain officer retention at baseline levels if the CP multiplier were set below a year’s 
worth of basic pay (p. 46).” The continuation pay multiplier even at the estimated level of 
5 or 7 was not enough compensation to sustain the same personnel levels for officers as 
there were under the legacy system beyond 12 years of active service. The study highlights 
a recommendation to the services to understand the current policies and programs in place 
for special pays and bonuses. Bonus programs and special pays are currently the ways for 
the services to offset military compensation. Knowing how effective they have been in the 
past in influencing personnel stay and leave decisions at various points in their career may 
assist the services in maintaining a healthy force with the right skills, experience, and 
quality of personnel.  
B. STUDIES ON BONUS PROGRAMS AND INCENTIVES 
RAND and CNA published numerous studies from 2000 to 2017 that estimated the 
effects of special pays on retention in the services. “The array of special pay and incentives 
as well as bonuses are policy variables that can facilitate management flexibility by 
offering an efficient means of varying the level of compensation in response to differences 
in the desirability of different locations and duties” (Asch, Hosek, & Warner, 2007, 
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p. 1113). Of these studies, three of them provide valuable insight on the estimated effects 
of bonuses on retention in three separate categories of pay incentives: aviation retention, 
selective retention bonus (SRB), and language bonus program.  
1. Aviation Retention  
The Effect of Compensation on Aviator Retention (Hansen & Moskowitz, 2006) 
examines the effect of monetary incentives on the retention of naval aviators. The authors’ 
analysis suggests that there is statistical significance that small increases in basic pay in the 
aviation community lead to an increase in pilot retention in the Navy (Hansen & 
Moskowitz, 2006, p. 45). Specifically, a $1,000 per year increase in Aviation Continuation 
Pay (ACP) has a positive effect in the retention rate of naval aviators, but the data suggests 
that the responsiveness was higher for propeller pilots than that of helicopter pilots. Of 
note, the authors recommend that the Navy pay particular attention to varying the levels of 
ACP for the different communities to ensure the service targets the bonus to the platform 
communities with higher shortages.  
2. Selective Retention Bonus (SRB) 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Lump Sum Bonuses for Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C 
Reenlistments: Final Report (Hattiagandi et al., 2004) to estimates the effects of SRB 
multiples on reenlistment rates by occupational field in the Marine Corps. The authors 
suggest that lump-sum SRBs significantly raised reenlistment rates in Zone A, Zone B, and 
Zone C, but the estimated effect of lump sum SRBs for Zone A reenlistments appeared to 
be too high. They highlight several drawbacks to their estimations. First, the large impact 
in Zone A estimate was probably “picking up more than the impact of the lump sum,” such 
as other special pay, allowances, and incentives (Hattiagandi et al., 2004, p. 47). Second, 
when controlling for occupational fields in estimating the SRB effect, they used many years 
of reenlistment information in an attempt to capture enough variation in the bonus levels 
within each occupational field. Some MOSs with high reenlistment rates have lower 
multiples, and MOSs with lower reenlistment rates tend to have higher multiples; therefore, 
the authors suggest the data in their study was not be rich enough to capture the true effects 
of the SRB on reenlistments. From the estimations, the researchers had difficulty 
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distinguishing between observations who were at the margin and reenlisting because of the 
level of multiple and the observations who would have reenlisted regardless of the level of 
multiple.  
3. Language Bonus Program 
The Navy began the Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Culture Awareness 
Program (LREC) in 2009 as a pilot program. In 2010, CNA conducted research and 
provided recommendations on the language incentive program structure for enlisted 
personnel and officers in the Navy Reserve. The purpose of the program was to incentivize 
reserve personnel take college courses in designated language and culture skills at 
Institutions of Higher Learning (IHLs). The bonus was in the form of a lump sum payment 
after agreeing to take the courses in the designated language (Moskowitz et al., 2010, p. 3). 
The research suggests that developing an efficient tracking system to identify reservists 
with language skills from the program and assigning them to geographic locations for 
mobilization would benefit the Navy. The mobilization to specific regions would develop 
an immersion approach to developing specific language skills that are perishable if not 
developed and used through time.  
4. Chapter Summary 
The chapter highlights some of the literature available regarding the demand of 
labor in the DoD. The association between economic theory and management practices 
within the services can assist the military in creating and implementing policies that are 
timely, applicable to the intended population groups, and efficient within budgetary 
constraints. Each of the services maintains some flexibility on how they manage pay 
incentive and bonus programs. Therefore, knowing how personnel responded to changes 
in the pay incentive programs in the past can prepare each service on how to offset the 
effects of “random shocks” to the system in the future.  
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II. EXPLANATION OF PAY INCENTIVES  
Title 37 USC is the statutory authority for pay and allowances in the uniformed 
services. Volume 7A of the DODFMR sets the limit for the maximum amount rate in each 
of the special pay and incentive bonus categories, which allows each of the services to 
design and tailor bonus and incentive programs to fit the demand for their respective 
service. Occasionally, the DoD develops and publishes separate directives and instructions 
to establish certain special pay and bonus programs as guidelines in order to standardize 
the policies across the services. However, the directives and instructions still allow the 
services to make adjustments and tailor their programs to their services’ needs. The Marine 
Corps publishes its policies and changes to the policies for each of the pay incentive 
programs through MCOs, MARADMINs, ALMARS, and MCBULs. Normally, MCOs 
establish the programs, MARADMINs provide updates to the programs, ALMARs 
communicate the CMC’s intent and importance of the programs, and MCBULs serve as 
annual updates to the programs with automatic cancellation dates set after one year (unless 
otherwise specified in the message). This chapter summarizes and tracks policy changes to 
15 special and incentive pays applicable to the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2017. The 
chapter categorizes the special and incentive pays in three major categories: incentives 
targeting retention through assignment, incentives targeting retention through special 
skills, and incentives targeting participation.  
A. INCENTIVES TARGETING RETENTION THROUGH ASSIGNMENTS 
Incentives targeting retention through assignment include Aviation Career 
Incentive Pay (ACIP), Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP), Fly Duty Pay, Overseas Extension 
Pay, and Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP). All five special pay categories serve as 
incentives for Marines to volunteer for an assignment resulting in a monthly payment at a 
set rate for the duration of the tour of duty. 
1. Aviation Career Incentive Pay  
MCO 1000.6 (ACTSMAN) describes the authority of the Marine Corps to issue 
orders to Marine aviators for flying duty (operational and non-operational) and to grant 
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waivers for aviators who do not meet performance requirements for the incentive. Chapter 
22, Volume 7A of the current version of the DODFMR extended the period of statutory 
authority for the entitlement to Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) until December 31, 
2017 (Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 2016). The DODFMR explains the 
provisions by which Marine aviators are allowed to receive ACIP.  
a. Summary of Aviation Career Incentive Pay  
Continuous ACIP is an entitlement that begins at the Aviation Service Entry Date 
(ASED), which is when the Marine reports to initial flight training. Officers who are above 
25 years of aviation service or are in the grade of O-6 or above are not entitled to ACIP. 
Marine aviators must meet a specific number of operational flight hours before reaching 
operational flying gates, or screening checkpoints, at the 12-year and 18-year mark in their 
careers.  
For example, before the first flight gate at 12 years in service, Marines must have 
at least 6 years of operational flight hours. As long as the Marine meets the requirement, 
the continuous ACIP extends until 18 years in service regardless of duty assignment. If a 
Marine does not have enough operational flight years at the first gate, he or she no longer 
has the entitlement to continuous ACIP but may request entitlement to conditional ACIP 
through Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps upon completing the required amount of 
operational flight hours per month. The second operational flight gate is when the Marine 
aviator reaches the 18-year mark. By 18 years, the Marine aviator is supposed to have 
accrued at least 9 to 11 years of operational flight time to be entitled to continuous ACIP 
until 22 years of aviation service. If the Marine aviator accrues at least 11 years of 
operational flight time at the second operational flight gate, his or her entitlement will 
extend until 25 years of service. Requests for operational flight gate waivers are routed 
through Manpower Management Officer Assignments (MMOA) for determination.  
b. Changes to ACIP Policy (2000–2017) 
The administrative updates from 2000–2017 to the ACIP policy are listed in Table 
1. Of note, the titles and numbers to the chapters in the DODFMR designated for the 
description of ACIP changed several times from 2000–2017.  
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Table 1.   Policy Changes to ACIP (2000–2017) 
 
 
ALMAR 405/97 announced the policy change on January 1, 1999, to the ACIP 
maximum rate increase for aviators to the amounts listed in Table 2. MCO 1000.6 
(ACTSMAN) explains that Marine aviators may be assigned to operational tours and non-
operational tours. Marine aviators receive continuous ACIP either at the DIFDEN rate 
when assigned non-operational tours of duty or at the DIFOP rate when assigned to 
operational tours of duty. The differences in pay table rates for DIFDEN and DIFOP from 
2000–2017 are not publicly published, but they may be available through Personnel and 
Allowance Advisory Notices (PAANs) archived at the Installation Personnel 
Administration Centers (IPACs). Please see Table 2 for the list of maximum rates for ACIP 
as published in the DODFMR: 
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Table 2.   ACIP Maximum Rates by Fiscal Year 
 
 
2. Assignment Incentive Pay 
The DODFMR (2012) explains the different assignment incentive programs 
available to the Marine Corps since 2006 (Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 2012). 
Some of the programs that used Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) as an incentive were the 
Deployment Extension Program, the Combat Extension Program, Marine Corps AIP 
Programs for Involuntary Extension of Tour Lengths in Iraq and Afghanistan, FY07 End 
Strength Incentive Program, Recruiter Extension Program, Special Mission Unit Program, 
and the Voluntary Extension Beyond 365 Days Boots on Ground in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
By 2011, the authorizations for most of the AIP programs ended, and the Marine Corps 
Assignment Incentive Pay Program for Special Mission Units (SMUs) and the AIP 
Program for Involuntary Extensions beyond one year are the current programs still 
applicable to Marines.  
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a. Summary of Assignment Incentive Pay 
The DODFMR (2016) explains the current policy for special mission unit (SMU) 
operators in the Marine Corps. Marines with less than 3 years of SMU service are eligible 
to receive AIP of $750 per month, while those with more than 3 years of service are eligible 
for $1,000 per month after completion of qualifying requirements. SMU operators are 
required to serve in SMU billets for 12 to 48 months while receiving AIP. Marines who 
are involuntarily extended in Iraq, Afghanistan, or other theater units beyond 365 days are 
eligible to receive payment on the amount of $800 per month beyond 365 days in theater.  
b. Changes to Assignment Incentive Pay (2000–2017) 
In 2007, the Marine Corps published MARADMIN 108/07 establishing 
Deployment Extension Program (DEP) for payment of AIP to Marines who were 
involuntarily extended as a result of a unit deployments. Marines who agreed to extend an 
enlistment or reenlistment to complete the deployment were eligible to receive $500 of AIP 
for every month they extended beyond their original EAS.  
MARADMIN 106/07 established the Recruiter Extension Program (REP) that was 
offered to select recruiters to remain in various recruiting billets. The AIP payment of $500 
per month encouraged recruiters to extend their tours for a duration of 6 to 12 months on 
station. The policy was extended through the end of fiscal year 2008.  
MARADMIN 323/07 in fiscal year 2007 established the Combat Extension 
Program offering payment of AIP to Marines who voluntarily extended their EAS beyond 
1 October 2007 in order to complete a 7-month or 12-month deployment in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, or the Horn of Africa. The AIP for 7-month deployments was a lump 
sum payment for $3,000 and the AIP for a 12-month deployment was $7,000. The 
deployment extension program ended in 2010.  
MARADMIN 107–07 established the FY07 End Strength Incentive Program for 
Marines under 27 years of service who reenlisted in FY07. Marines with less than 20 years 
of service were offered $10,000 in lump sum for reenlisting for four years, and Marines 
who had over 20 years of service but less than 27 years were offered $10,000 in lump sum 
to serve another three-year enlistment. The AIP payment was eligible for the combat zone 
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tax exclusion if the Marine signed the AIP agreement in a combat zone. The program ended 
in July 2009.  
The Involuntary Extension Compensation Policy (IEC) was adjusted in 2008 to 
authorize Marines who were involuntarily extended in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, or the 
Horn of Africa entitlement to $800 per month for every month they were involuntarily 
extended beyond 12 months from the date they arrived in theater (also known as the boots 
on ground (BOG) date). By the end of 2008, the AIP payment under IEC increased to 
$1,000 per month.  
Also in 2008, the FY09 Operating Force Extension Incentive extended the authority 
to pay Marines (in designated operating force categories) $18,000 in lump sum who agreed 
to sign 18-month extensions and $20,000 to Marines who agreed to sign 23-month 
extensions. The Operating Force Extension Incentive ended in June 2009. After the 
drawdown, the policy for AIP was updated in 2011 to authorize AIP in the amount of 
$1,000 per month for the involuntary extensions in support of specific operations in a 
combat zone if the unit was involuntarily extended beyond the initial 365 days in country. 
It also authorized the payment of $250 per month to Marines on involuntary extensions 
while serving in units involuntarily extended in a combat zone beyond the 210-day mark 
but less than 365 days in country. Table 3 is the comprehensive list of references 




Table 3.   Reference Changes to Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) 
 
 
3. Fly Duty Pay 
Flight duty pay is a hazard duty incentive pay (HDIP) listed under DODFMR 
(2016) Volume 7A, Chapter 22. MCO 1000.6 (CMC, 2013) and MCO 1326.2G are the 
assignment policies that explain the process by which officer and enlisted Marines are 
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assigned to fly duty on orders as crew members or non-crew members. Both crewmembers 
and non-crew members are entitled to HDIP upon assignment on orders to fly duty.  
a. Summary of Fly Duty Pay  
The DODFMR (2016) states that a member is entitled to fly duty HDIP when a 
member on orders participates in frequent and regular aerial flights at a minimum or four 
hours of aerial flight per month. The regulation states that members must fulfill the 
minimum flight hours for each month, but if they are under the requirement for a current 
month, they may apply excess flight hours from the previous five months to qualify for fly 
duty HDIP in the current month. Officers who receive ACIP and enlisted personnel who 
receive payments under the Career Enlisted Fly Incentive Program (CEFIP) are not entitled 
to duty HDIP.  
b. Summary of Changes to Fly Duty Pay 
Table 4 is the list of administrative updates to the policy for fly duty pay and the 
list of pay rates per the DODFMR from 2000 to 2017. The pay tables make a distinction 
between the rates for personnel who are assigned as crewmembers and the personnel who 
are assigned as non-crewmembers of a unit who are eligible for HDIP. MCO 1326.2G is 
the regulation for the administration of temporary flight orders to enlisted members and 
some officers who participate in aerial flights as members or non-crew members. The 
assignment to this type of duty is temporary and on a voluntary basis. An example of a 
crewmember eligible for fly duty HDIP is a MV-22 crew chief who performs flight duties 
directly associated to in-flight operations and maintains the minimum flight hour 
requirements. An example of a non-crew member who could be eligible for fly duty HDIP 
under the non-crew member rate is an aerial gunner or observer assigned to temporary duty 
during frequent flight operations. HDIP for crew members vary by pay grade, while HDIP 
for non-crew members is a flat rate of $150 per month. Eligibility begins when a Marine is 
assigned to duty under temporary flight orders and begins to accrue the minimum number 




Table 4.   Reference Updates and Pay Tables for FDHDIP (2000–2017) 
  
 
4. Overseas Extension Pay 
Overseas extension pay is an incentive given to members to extend a tour of duty 
at designated overseas locations. The designated overseas locations vary by service 
department. The DODFMR (2016) is the current regulation that explains the entitlement to 
overseas extension pay under the Overseas Tour Extension Incentives Program (OTEIP). 
The current regulation for the Marine Corps for OTEIP in the Marine Corps is MCO 1300.8 
(2014): Marine Corps Personnel Assignment Policy. 
a. Summary of Overseas Extension Pay 
The DODFMR (2016) sets regulations on the maximum limits for payments under 
OTEIP. Special pay in monthly installments may not exceed $80 per month, and the annual 
bonus (paid in either lump or monthly installments) may not exceed $2,000 per year. The 
member must have a specialty that qualifies him or her under OTEIP, completed a tour of 
duty at a designated overseas location, and executed an agreement to extend for another 
period of duty that is at least one year. MCO 1040.31 (2010) establishes the OTEIP for 
enlisted Marines serving at dependents restricted MCCs, aboard ships 
homeported outside CONUS and Hawaii, and both MCCs at Marine 
Barracks, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), MCCs 044, 045, and 092 
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(MCASs, Iwakuni and Futenma, and MCB Camp Butler, respectively, 
Company D, MarSptBn, and Marine Corps Security Force Company, 
Panama. All MCCs at Diego Garcia are included in this program (A-4).  
Career-designated officers from any MOS at the designated locations are also 
eligible for the incentive. As part of the incentives under this program, Marines accepted 
for OTEIP may elect to receive $166.66 per month for each of the 12 months extended, 30-
day rest and recuperative leave (R&R), or a 15-day special R&R leave with a government 
funded round trip ticket to the nearest point of entry in CONUS.  
b. Summary of Changes to Overseas Extension Pay 
In 2009, Marines began submitting overseas extension requests under OTEIP 
through Total Force Retention System (TFRS). Prior to 2009, Marines submitted requests 
through the Overseas Processing System (OEPS). Once approved for an overseas 
extension, Marines are advised on their conditions of the entitlement to overseas extension 
pay under OTEIP. Marines who agree to serve under a voluntary extension under OTEIP 
are not eligible for Consecutive Overseas Tour (COT) or In-Place Consecutive Tours 
(IPCOT) allowances. Table 5 summarizes the administrative changes applicable to 
overseas extension pay from 2000–2017.  




5. Special Duty Assignment Pay  
Volume 7A, Chapter 8 of the DODFMR (2017) is the current reference explaining 
an enlisted member’s entitlement to Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP). The Marine 
Corps revised the policy for SDAP via MARADMIN in 2017 to reflect the current rates by 
billet.  
a. Summary of Special Duty Assignment Pay 
The DODFMR (2017) says that a member is entitled to SDAP when the member 
performs in an assigned duty that the service component designates as “extremely difficult 
or involving an unusual degree of responsibility (Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 
2017).” The Marine Corps may involuntary select Marines and Marines may voluntarily 
select to perform in such special duty assignments as long as they meet the requirements 
to perform those duties. The Marine Corps uses SDAP as an incentive tool to attract high 
quality enlisted Marines to sustain healthy manning levels at special duty assignments. 
Marines who receive SDAP are also able to receive other pay or allowances to which they 
are entitled.  
b. Changes to Special Duty Assignment Pay  
The SDAMAN (Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1999) included six special duty 
assignments in the Marine Corps: MSG (8151), Marine Corps Security Force Guard 
(8152), Marine Corps Security Force Trainer (8153), Marine Corps Security Force Close 
Quarters Battle Team Member (8154), Recruiter (8411), and Drill Instructor (8511). SDAP 
was only authorized for 8411/8412 (Career Recruiter) MOS at the $375.00 monthly rate, 
8511 MOS at the $275.00 monthly rate, and 8151 MOS at the $110.00 monthly rate. By 
2001, the monthly rate for the different SDA pay levels were changed to reflect the amounts 
in Table 6. In 2003, the Marine Corps released MARADMIN 185/03 (2003) that included 
Marine Combat Instructors (MOS 8513) as eligible for SDAP upon assignment at the SD-
1 level rate. In 2006, SDAP was authorized for Marines in the grades of E4-E9 to receive 
SDAP at SD levels 2 through 5 if they were assigned to Marine Corps Forces Special 
Operations Command (MARSOC) by billet.  
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Table 6.   SDAP Pay Rates (2000–2017) 
 
 
MARADMIN 712/07 (2007) announced the authorization for slated sergeants 
major and master gunnery sergeants serving as senior enlisted advisors to a general or 
senior executive service beginning in fiscal year 2008. The level of pay depended on the 
billet the senior enlisted advisor was holding. For example, the Sergeant Major of the 
Marine Corps received SD-6 pay, while senior enlisted advisors to three-star and two star 
generals received SD-4 and SD-3 rates, respectively. In 2008, the SDAP levels increased 
for Marine Combat Instructors to the SD-3 level. From 2009 to 2013, several 
MARADMINs were released to update the increase or decrease SDAP rates for certain 
billets, and more special billet assignments were added to the authorized list for SDAP. 
MARADMIN 302/17 (2017) is the advance notice to cancel the MCO 7220.12R (2013) 
Special Duty Assignment Pay Program (SDAP) and updates the current SDAP rates by 
billet. Table 7 lists the administrative updates to the SDAP policy from 2000–2017. 
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B. INCENTIVES TARGETING RETENTION THROUGH SPECIAL SKILLS 
Incentives targeting retention through special skills are Aviation Continuation Pay 
(ACP), Career Status Bonus (CSB), Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), Enlisted 
Bonus Program (EBP), Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Bonus (FLPB), and Selective 
Retention Bonus (SRB). All six incentive pays target the accession and retention of 
Marines in designated MOS’s with projected shortages.  
1. Aviation Continuation Pay 
Chapter 20 of the DODFMR refers to Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) as the 
Aviation Retention Bonus (AvB). The Marine Corps publishes the eligibility requirements 
through MCBULs, which specify the qualification criteria for application to receive ACP. 
The criteria for ACP varies from year to year, but generally, Marine aviators who are 
eligible must sign an agreement to have an additional year or more of obligated service to 
receive a lump or periodic payment of the bonus.  
a. Summary of Aviation Continuation Pay  
Under the current version of the DODFMR (2017), ACP is a bonus available on a 
selective basis offered to members of the Regular or Reserve Component when there is a 
projected shortage for qualified aviation specialties. The DODFMR limits the bonus to 
those periods in and aviation officer’s career where the projected retention trend is a 
concern to the military service (20-3). 
b. Changes to Aviation Continuation Pay (2000–2017) 
From 1999 to 2017, the DODFMR limited the maximum amount of payment of 
ACP to $25,000 for each year covered by the agreement to remain on active duty. From 
2003 to 2009, the Marine Corps released several MCBULs incentivizing fixed wing, rotary 
wing, and naval flight officers to sign a contract for ACP in exchange for a long term or 
short term obligated service commitment. Table 8 is the list of the ACP amounts offered 
for the different platforms during this period. 
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Table 8.   ACP Pay Table for Aviation Platforms (2003–2009) 
 
 
The messages defined a long-term contract as an agreement available to majors or 
major selects who had 37 or more months left to complete 16 years of service. Short-term 
contracts were 12 to 16 month agreements available to captains for remaining on active 
duty until 16 years of service. Due to the retirement of the CH-46 (rotary wing) platform, 
the Marine Corps released MARADMIN 366/11 to solicit requests for voluntary early 
release from ACP contracts in the 7562 community. Table 9 is a comprehensive list to the 
changes to the ACP policy from 2000 to 2017. 
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Table 9.   Reference Changes to Aviation Continuation Pay (2000–2017) 
 
 
2. Career Status Bonus  
Beginning in August 2001, Marines who entered the service after July 1985 were 
offered a choice at 15 years of service to elect the Career Status Bonus (CSB/REDUX) 
retirement plan or retirement under the “high three” system. The Marine Corps required 
personnel to sign documentation in front of their commanding officers if they chose to elect 
the CSB/REDUX plan at 15 years because the decision was irrevocable. Members who 
elected retirement under the CSB/REDUX agreed to receive a one-time $30,000 bonus 
payment after 15 years of service in exchange for agreeing to serve until 20 years of service 
and retiring at a reduced retirement rate for life.  
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a. Summary of Career Status Bonus 
From 2000 to 2012, the Marine Corps published five MARADMINs explaining the 
CSB/REDUX and providing Marines with links to CNA’s retirement choice calculators. 
The messages urged Marines to seek counseling on their options for retirement at 15 years 
and cautioned the force about the potential of losing over $300,000 over the course of a 
lifetime if a member elected to receive CSB/REDUX at 15 years of service.  
b. Changes to the Career Status Bonus (2000–2017) 
MARADMIN 210/17 discontinued the CSB/REDUX plan by not allowing Marines 
to sign agreements for the CSB/REDUX after 31 December 2017. From the first date 
Marines became eligible to elect the bonus, the election percentage per year dropped from 
60 percent to 26 percent in fiscal year 2007. By fiscal year 2011, 11 percent of all Marines 
eligible for CSB/REDUX elected the option. Table 10 lists the references applicable to 
administrative changes to the CSB/REDUX. 




3. Critical Skills Retention Bonus  
DoD Directive 1304.21 (DoD, 2005) the DoD policy that directs the Marine Corps 
to administer the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) and recommend specific military 
skills to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (PDUSD) for designation as 
“critical” to the Marine Corps mission. The directive also states that the service is required 
make at least an annual review of the military skills designated for the bonus and revise the 
list as necessary to “attain bonus objectives” (p. 4). The CSRB is an authorized bonus under 
Title 37 USC. 
a. Summary of the Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
The purpose of the CSRB is to serve as a financial incentive paid to enlisted 
Marines and officers, in a critical MOS, who agree to reenlist or continue serving on active 
duty for at least one additional year beyond their current obligated service end date. The 
DoD Directive 1304.21 states that  
the intent of the bonus is to provide a financial incentive to influence the 
decisions of Service members in designated critical skills taking into 
consideration current or projected manning shortages, skill imbalances, and 
high training costs, or high replacement costs. In cases where less costly 
methods are inadequate or impractical. (DoD Directive 1304.21, p. 9)  
The maximum limit a service member may receive in CSRB bonus payments over 
the course of his or her career is $200,000, and the annual payment for may not exceed 
$30,000 (with exceptions). The directive authorizes the services to set the limits of the 
bonus based on length of commitment, and members who are over 25 years or service are 
not authorized to receive any CSRB payments. 
b. Changes to the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (2000–2017)  
In October 2008, the Marine Corps released MARADMIN 611/08 that provided 
the CSRB incentive to captains serving in an MOS in the combat arms, combat support, 
and aviation community. All Marine captains in eligible MOSs were authorized to receive 
a $4,000 lump sum payment in exchange for agreeing to remain on active duty for 12 
additional months beyond their current obligated service. The intent of the policy was to 
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contract as many eligible Marine captains as possible before 30 November 2008 and 
potentially give them orders beginning in calendar year 2009. 
The Marine Corps published MARADMIN 106/11 to establish the eligibility 
requirements for Marines assigned to MARSOC or JSOC to receive the CSRB beginning 
in December 2010. Enlisted Marines in the grade of E-7 and above who completed at least 
19 years of service and received certified training under MARSOC or JSOC were eligible 
to apply for and receive a lump sum payment for the following amounts: $18,000 for 2 
years of additional service, $30,000 for 3 years, and $50,000 for 4 years. The policy was 
extended through fiscal year 2013 for MARSOC and through 2012 for JSOC Marines who 
were eligible. 
The Marine Corps released MARADMIN 621/13 that made the CSRB available to 
Marines in the grade of E-7 and above with over 19 years of active service in the critical 
skills MOS of 0372 - critical skills operator (CSO). Marines eligible were offered a lump 
sum bonus of $18,000 in fiscal year 2014 in exchange for 3 years of additional obligated 
service. In June 2014, the CSRB rate for 0372 became $50,000 in exchange for an 
additional 4 years of service. In fiscal year 2015, the rates for the lump sum changed to 
$40,000 for 4 years, $24,000 for 3 years, and $14,000 for 2 years. The fiscal year CSRB 
program for the 0372 MOS ended in August 2015 and was reinstated again for fiscal year 
2017. The available CSRB payment amount during fiscal year 2017 was $50,000 for 4 
years, $30,000 for 3 years, and $18,000 for 2 years. MARADMIN 254/17 updated 
minimum and maximum years of service for eligibility under the CSRB for 0372s to 20 
years and 28 years respectively for fiscal year 2017. Table 11 is tracks the administrative 
references changing the policy for CSRB. 
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Table 11.   Changes to References for CSRB (2000–2017) 
 
 
4. Enlistment Bonus Program 
DoD Directive 1304.21 (2005) is the DoD policy regarding the use of enlistment 
bonuses to meet DoD personnel requirements. The purpose of the enlistment bonus is to 
serve as a monetary incentive paid to individuals who agree to enlist for a period of active 
duty service in a military skill or occupation designated as critical to the service 
department. DoD Instruction 1304.31 assigns the responsibilities, provides procedures for 
payment of the bonus, and identifies the eligibility requirements for the bonus. The 
instruction encourages the services to use the Enlistment Bonus Program (EBP) in a cost-
effective manner, gives the services the ability to identify whether or not the payments 
should be in lump sum or periodic payments, and sets the limits for the maximum amounts 
of associated with the minimum years for obligated service.  
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a. Summary of the Enlisted Bonus Program 
MCO 1130.53R (Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2012) establishes the 
Enlistment Bonus Program (EBP) for the Marine Corps. This bonus is a monetary incentive 
that Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) uses to attract qualified applicants into 
designated MOS’s that are critical, short, and hard to fill in order to meet mission each 
fiscal year. CMC (MP) publishes the different award levels via MARADMIN prior to the 
beginning of each fiscal year with associated Program Enlisted For (PEF) code for the 
critically short and hard to fill MOSs. In order to receive the bonus, Marines must complete 
all required training and receive the designated MOS.  
b. Changes to the Enlisted Bonus Program (2000–2017) 
Table 12 is a consolidated list of the changes to the references surrounding the EBP. 
CMC (MP) released several MOS categories available under the EBP from 2006 to 2017. 
In 2006, the Marine Corps published MARADMIN 139/06 to announce the EBP under the 
UZ Program for MOS 0321 Reconnaissance Man. The intent of the incentive was to pay 
$10,000 to each Marine who enlisted under the program and successfully attained the 
MOS. At the time, the Marine Corps had to grow the structure for the MOS from 938 
Marines to 1648 by fiscal year 2010. In 2009, the Marine Corps updated the incentive to a 
$7,500 bonus payment under the VZ Program for the 0321 MOS in exchange for a 5-year 
enlistment contract. 
 28 
Table 12.   Changes to References for EBP (2000–2017) 
 
 
All monetary incentive amounts for the EBP as well as associated PEF codes are 
displayed in Table 13 for fiscal years 2011 to 2017.  
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Table 13.   Pay Table for Enlisted Bonus Program (2011–2017) 
 
 
5. Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Bonus 
DoD Directive 5160.41E (DoD, 2015) establishes the current policy for the Defense 
Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Program. DODI 1340.27 (DoD, 2013) 
that assigns responsibility of establishing Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Bonus 
(FLPB) programs to the head of each service department. MCO 7220.52F is the Marine 
Corps’ current policy for FLPB Program, which provides instructions for the 
administration of FLPB guidance on updates to the criteria for eligibility.  
a. Summary for Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Bonus 
The purpose of the FLPB program is to “identify, maintain, and enhance foreign 
language capabilities by providing bonuses to Marines with demonstrated language skills” 
(CMC, 2016). The Marine Corps screens officers and enlisted personnel upon accession 
and enters any applicable foreign language codes in Marine Corps Total Force System 
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(MCTFS). For many languages, the FLPB is offered to select Marines who meet the 
minimum qualifying score of “2” in at least two of the three subtests of the Defense 
Language Proficiency Test (DLPT): Listening, Reading, and Speaking. Marines must 
recertify on the DLPT on an annual basis in order to receive continued payment under 
FLPB. If a Marine receives a score of “3” on two out of the three subtests, then the 
recertification is required every 2 years. The maximum rate that a Marine can receive for 
one language is $500 per month or $1,000 per month for multiple languages.  
 The Marine Corps has two pay category rates: FLPB Schedule 1 for languages in 
Category A, and FLPB Schedule 2 for languages in Category B. The Director of 
Intelligence (DIRINT) for the Marine Corps announces the list of languages designated in 
Category A and Category B via MARDMINs on an annual basis and distributes the list via 
separate correspondence through DC, M&RA and to the IPACs. Category A languages are 
designated as “Immediate and Emerging Languages” and are associated with higher rates, 
while Category B languages are considered “Enduring” and are associated with the lower 
rates. Both categories are available to all Marines who are eligible regardless of rank, MOS, 
or billet.  
The Director of Intelligence also maintains a separate list of languages designated 
as “prevalent in force” identified as a “strategic capability” for Marines who possess a 
primary military occupational specialty (PMOS) or additional military occupational 
specialty (AMOS) of 26XX or 02XX (career linguists), an AMOS of 8440 – 8249 (FAO), 
an AMOS 8230–3239 (FAS), an AMOS 2799 (military interpreter), a PMOS 0370 or 0372 
assigned to MARSOC, a BMOS 8411 (recruiter) or 8156 (Marine Security Guard) assigned 
to duty. Marines who meet the requirements for possessing a prevalent in force language 
are also eligible for entitlements under the FLPB. DIRINT announces the annual list of 
prevalent in force languages with associate entitlements via MARADMIN and distributes 
the list via separate correspondence via M&RA to the IPACs. Table 14 is a detailed list of 
policy changes under the LREC Program, which include changes to the FLPB. 
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Table 14.   Reference Changes to FLPB (2000–2017) 
 
 
b. Changes to the Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Bonus 
The Commandant of the Marine Corps (MP) conducted a program review of the 
Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Program (FLPP) in 2003 as a result of having identified 
language skills as a unique operational capability in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the same year, 
all Marines in every unit were screened for identification of language capabilities. Those 
Marines who were identified as having a foreign language skill regardless of source were 
reported in MCTFS under specific codes. Marines who entered the service prior to 2002 
may have not been screened for language capabilities. From 2003 to 2004, the Marine 
Corps temporarily waived the requirement for the annual recertification on the DLPT due 
to a large number of deployed Marines who needed to maintain FLPP payments. In 2004, 
Marines selected for the AMOS 8611 (Interpreter) were eligible for the FLPP for up to 
$200 per month for one language and up to $300 per month for multiple languages. From 
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2004 to 2005, the Marine Corps also offered reenlistment incentives for Arabic language 
school seats and higher reenlistment multiples for Marines with specific language codes in 
MCTFS. MCO 7220.52E (CMC, 2006) established the criteria for Marines to qualify for 
the FLPP in three different categories: Category A, B, and C. Category A was for languages 
listed as “Immediate Investment,” Category B was for languages listed as “Stronghold,” 
and Category C was for “Other.”  
In 2007, the Marine Corps announced a change to from the previous version of the 
DLPT (paper and pencil) to the DLPT-5 (web-based version). In 2008, Marines who were 
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) were exempted from annual recertification for the FLPP, but were required to re-
test 90 days after redeployment (return to home station). In 2010, the Marine Corps 
established the Free MOS 2799 (military interpreter) to quickly identify Marines with 
specific critical skills in certain languages to serve as interpreters on short notice. From 
2010 to 2015, the Marine Corps announced solicitations for programs such as the FAO 
program for officers and the FAS program for SNCOs with associated FLPP incentives for 
earning the additional MOS. In 2016, MCO 7720.52F cancelled the previous order and 
established the current FLPB program. Table 15 tracks the changes and updates to the 
schedule of monthly payments based on the language pay category.  
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Table 15.   Changes to the FLPP/FLPB Payment Schedule (2006–2017) 
 
6. Selective Retention Bonus 
The current DoD reference for the Selective Retention Bonus (SRB) is DODFMR 
(DoD, 2017) Volume 7A, Chapter 9. The regulation describes the SRB eligibility criteria 
for members of the military who agree to reenlist or extend in a MOS under the conditions 
set by the service departments. To qualify for the bonus, members must be at least in the 
grade of E-3 or higher, reenlist for at least 3 years or extend an enlistment for at least a 
year, and execute a written agreement with the service detailing the exact amount, method 
of payment, period of service and MOS. MCO 7220.24P (CMC, 2016) is the current 
Marine Corps policy for the SRB Program. The Marine Corps publishes an annual MCBUL 
7220 that announces the SRB policy changes for every fiscal year.  
a. Summary of Selective Retention Bonus 
The Marine Corps designates a PMOS as eligible for the SRB when M&RA 
identifies a critical shortage in the MOS that may impact the mission of the Marine Corps. 
The service considers the high cost of the training pipeline and the demand for the specific 
skill in the civilian market when designating a PMOS under the SRB program. In order to 
be eligible, a Marine must be in the active component, serve as an E-3 or above and 
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recommended for reenlistment, have a designated PMOS on the annual MCBUL, reenlist 
for at least 36 months, and meet the qualification skills for the MOS prior to payment. 
Marines may receive more than one SRB payment in lump sum during their careers, but 
they may not receive more than $200,000 over the course of their careers.  
b. Changes to the Selective Retention Bonus 
From fiscal year 2004 through 2007, the Marine Corps used a multiples system to 
calculate the total amount of the SRB. In fiscal year 2008, the Marine Corps changed to a 
flat rate system that showed pre-calculated amounts based on the Marine’s reenlistment date 
and whether or not the Marine reenlists for 48 months beyond his or her current EAS. From 
2009 to 2013, Marines who reenlisted early or who were in specific PMOSs under the grade 
of E-5 were eligible for the SRB kicker—an additional payment on top of the original SRB. 
From 2004 to 2017, the list of PMOSs that were designated on the annual MCBUL for the 
SRB changed, but there was an overall increase in the maximum amounts for the SRB 
payments in each zone. Several changes to the SRB programs were released every fiscal year 
extending the dates for Marines to reenlist under the SRB program if funding was still 
available. Table 16 is a summary of the cap amount for the SRB for each zone from 2000 to 
2017. The list of administrative changes for the SRB is available in the Appendix.  
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Table 16.   Cap Amounts for SRB (2000–2017) 
 
 
C. INCENTIVES TARGETING PARTICIPATION  
Incentives targeting participation include Acceleration Duty (ACCEL) Pay, 
Additional Uniform Allowance, Assisted Living Allowance, and Hostile Fire Pay (HFP). 
All four incentives target requests for special pays incident to a Marine’s involvement in 
assigned experimental duties, hostile fire events, or duties requiring additional cash 
allowances. 
1. Acceleration Duty (ACCEL) Pay 
The Chapter 24, Volume 7A of the DODFMR describes the general requirements 
for a service member’s entitlement to ACCEL pay, also referred as “experimental stress 
duty.” MCO 1000.6 (CMC, 2013) is the policy for assignment, classification, and 
distribution of enlisted and officer personnel in the Marine Corps. Although the policy does 
not mention the types of duties associated with ACCEL pay, it defers to Chapter 24 of the 
DODFMR for specifications to entitlement for other related duties, such as parachute duty, 
flight deck duty, and demolition duty.  
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a. Summary of Acceleration Pay 
ACCEL pay is a type of hazard duty incentive pay (HDIP) that begins when a 
member is assigned or ordered to a specific duty as a “human acceleration or deceleration 
experimental subject” (Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 2017). The DODFMR 
defines human deceleration experimental subject duty as “duty performed as human 
acceleration or deceleration experimental subjects utilizing acceleration or deceleration 
devices” (USD Comptroller, 2017). The HDIP begins when a member reports to duty and 
ends when a member detaches from duty as a human acceleration experimental subject. If 
the member does not serve in the duty the whole month, he or she is entitled to a prorated 
amount.  
b. Changes to Acceleration Pay Policy (2000–2017) 
The DoD updated administrative changes to the ACCEL pay policy in the 
DODFMR several times between 2000 and 2017, but the general provisions to the 
entitlement did not change during this period. The below table lists the administrative 
changes and updates to the ACCEL pay policy from 2000–2017: 




 The amount of ACCEL pay remained unchanged from 2000 to 2017 at a monthly 
rate of $150 per month. 
Table 18.   Acceleration Duty Pay Table (2000–2017) 
 
 
2. Additional Uniform Allowance 
Supplementary and miscellaneous uniform allowances are authorized to Marines 
as part of their assigned duties in various forms and quantities. Marines who serve in billets 
on recruiting duty, Marine Security Guard (MSG) duty, musician duty, or other 
assignments that require the wear of proper civilian attire on a regular basis are potentially 
eligible for receipt of an additional uniform allowance. Chapter 30 of the DODFMR (USD 
Comptroller, 2017) also explains the entitlement for reserve officers who are ordered to 
active duty for more than 90 days to receive an additional uniform clothing allowance 
payable at the time of entry or reentry.  
a. Summary of Additional Uniform Allowance 
MCO P10120.28G lists four different categories of cash clothing allowances 
reportable in the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS): civilian clothing monetary 
allowances, personal items allowance for enlisted women, miscellaneous enlisted cash 
clothing allowances, and cash clothing allowances for officers (CMC, 2005). Commanding 
Officers are responsible for the initial request, annual certification, and recertification of 
civilian replacement amounts based on the unit of assignment, description of billet, 
duration of tour. Enlisted Marines are also authorized to request an additional uniform 
allowance for the purchase of maternity uniforms. All requests for supplementary clothing 
allowances are submitted through the Permanent Marine Corps Uniform Board (PMCUB) 
in Quantico, VA for approval.  
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b. Changes to Additional Uniform Allowance (2000–2017) 
The DODFMR (Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 2001) changed the 
entitlement for officers eligible for the additional active duty uniform allowance from $100 
to $200. MCBUL 10120 for each fiscal year publishes the varying authorized amounts for 
each type of additional uniform allowance. Table 19 tracks the administrative changes to 
the references for the additional uniform allowances as set by the DoD and the Marine 
Corps.  
Table 19.   Reference Changes to the Additional Uniform Allowance 
 
 
The Marine Corps sets and conditions for requesting additional uniform allowances 
in MCBUL 10120 for each fiscal year. The largest changes to the additional uniform 
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allowance each year are in the additional uniform allowance for civilian clothing category. 
Table 20 is the published annual limit for additional uniform allowances for civilian 
clothing per the DODFMR:  
Table 20.   Additional Uniform Allowance (Civilian: 2000–2017) 
 
 
The actual maximum limits for 2000 and 2001 are no longer available on the 
DODFMR website, but Table 20 shows the slight allowance increases each year from 2002 
to 2017. The amounts designated as “Permanent” are applicable to assignments to a 
permanent change of station (PCS) tour of duty, while the amounts listed under 
“Temporary” are applicable to temporary additional duty (TAD) assignments. 
3. Assisted Living Allowance 
The current instruction for the assisted living allowance is the DoD Manual 1341.12 
(DoD, 2015). The instruction provides the eligibility forms, determination of compensation 
levels, the assessment process for establishing need for assistance with daily activities, and 
sets the conditions of removal from the entitlement.  
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a. Summary of Assisted Living Allowance  
In August 2011, the DoD released the instruction under Title 37 USC regarding the 
Special Compensation for Assistance with Activities of Daily Living (SCAADL). The 
Marine Corps released MARADMIN 501/11 in September 2011, which gives MP Division 
the responsibility of the SCAADL policy and responsibility of execution to Wounded 
Warrior Regiment (WRR) and MF Division. Marines who are eligible for SCAADL must 
receive an evaluation and determination from a DoD or VA medical physician to have a 
“catastrophic injury” that requires a caregiver’s assistance in the performing daily 
activities. The amount the member receives is dependent on the tier level based on the 
member’s injuries and evaluation from a medical physician. Recertification for SCAADL 
is every 180 days based on a medical reevaluation. The payments are authorized to continue 
until up to 90 days after the Marine separates from active duty.  
b. Changes to Assisted Living Allowance (2000–2017) 
From 2008 to 2011, compensation for combat-related injuries were explained in the 
DODFMR under Chapter 13: Combat-Related Injury Rehabilitation Program. In 2012, the 
DoD updated the DODFMR to reflect the general provisions regarding the assisted living 
allowance under SCAADL in Chapter 13. Table 21 is a summary of the major changes to 
SCAADL from 2000–2017.  
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Table 21.   Reference Changes to Assisted Living Allowance 
(2000–2017) 
 
4. Hostile Fire Pay 
Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) is a special pay authorized under Title 37 USC 310. The 
DODFMR (USD Comptroller, 2017) explains the entitlement to HFP in Volume 7A, 
Chapter 10: Special Pay – Duty Subject to Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger. The chapter 
explains the distinction between entitlement to HFP and imminent danger pay (IDP). Both 
are considered special pays, but commanders must certify HFP for members of their units 
regardless of geographic location if they were subject to a hostile fire incident or explosion. 
IDP is an automatic entitlement given to members based on assigned duty to IDP areas 
listed in the DODFMR. 
a. Summary of Hostile Fire Pay 
HFP is an event-driven entitlement pay to members who were exposed to and in 
close proximity of a hostile fire incident or explosion. On-scene commanders are 
responsible for certifying that the incidents of hostile fire occurred and identifying the 
Marines who met the requirement for HFP. According to MARADMIN 085/12 (CMC, 
2012), “If a member is authorized HFP for any calendar month, they will be authorized 
225 dollars for that month and no dollar amount of IDP is payable for that same calendar 
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month.” In other words, if a member was subject to a certified hostile fire incident on one 
day out of the month, he or she will receive HFP for the whole month. Also, the Marine 
would not be able to receive IDP for the same month. 
b. Summary of Changes to Hostile Fire Pay 
Special situations to entitlement to HFP are explained in the DODFMR. Effective 
in 2008, the Marine Corps established the policy for the Continuation of Pay and 
Allowances (PAC) Program that allows a member who is injured in the line of duty while 
serving in a hostile fire area to continue being paid for the entitlement for up to 12 months 
after the beginning date the first hospitalization. MARADMIN 0111/09 updated the policy 
to extend the PAC entitlements to eligible members until the date the Marine is returned to 
full duty, the date the member is discharged, or one year after the date the member was 
first hospitalized. In 2010, the current policy for PAC was updated in MARADMIN 227/10 
to add the requirement that PAC recipients in an outpatient status be in a “medically 
restricted duty status” to qualify for the program (CMC, 2010). Table 22 lists the 
administrative policy changes to the HFP from 2000 to 2010 as well as the pay table for 
the entitlement to HFP. 
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Table 22.   Changes to References and Pay Table for HFP (2000–2017) 
 
 
5. Chapter Summary 
The summarization of the pay incentives by category and the reference list for 
changes to the pay incentives serve as a guide to some of the areas where the Marine Corps 
can analyze response rates with available data. For example, the summary section covering 
the SRB program tracks the policies that changed response rates for various MOS’s 
throughout the Marine Corps based on projected shortages. Having a better understanding 
of how personnel responded to the large and small changes in available bonuses affecting 
assignments and retention during an increase in end strength and a decrease in end strength 
can improve the management of the programs to best support the Force of the Future 2025 
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III. DATA ANALYSIS AND PROGRAM REVIEW 
In the first section of this chapter, I provide an analysis on aggregate data and the 
calculated take-up rates for each of the pay incentives. It also provides insight into how the 
average annual amounts at the end of each fiscal year have changed from 2000 to 2017. I 
use a cross-sectional dataset in this portion of the analysis consists that of 569,255 
observations from TFDW. To create this dataset, TFDW took a snapshot of the entire 
Marine population in MCTFS on September 30th of each fiscal year who received payment 
in one of the 15 pay incentive categories and recorded the total dollar amount that each 
observation received throughout the fiscal year. The percentages for the take-up rates were 
calculated as number of Marines who received some positive amount divided by total end 
strength numbers for the Marine Corps as of September 30 of each fiscal year. The end 
strength numbers for each service are available on the DoD statistical reports section on 
the DMDC website.  
The second section in this chapter is a program review of the FLPB. This section 
describes the change in the average dollar amount of FLPB that eligible Marines received 
by the end of each fiscal year. The program review also provides an overview of significant 
observations from FLPB policy changes and the data available for the eligible Marine 
population. The analysis uses the same pay dataset from the first section of the chapter. In 
addition, for a more extensive analysis, I also use a separate cross-sectional dataset from 
TFDW consisting of 663,866 observations. To build this dataset, TFDW took a snapshot 
of the entire Marine population with a foreign language code in MCTFS on September 
30th of each fiscal year. The dataset includes information on the observations’ language 
skill level if they took the DLPT as well as the source of language skills (home 
environment, military institution, or civilian institution).  
A. DATA ANALYSIS ON PAY INCENTIVES 
This section analyzes the pay incentives within the three major categories described 
in Chapter III: assignment pay incentives, retention pay incentives by skill, and pay 
incentives incident to involvement in special activities. This section also includes an 
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analysis on two groups of Marine Corps personnel (enlisted Marines and Marine aviators) 
who are independently affected by both assignment-related and retention-related pay 
incentives for each fiscal year (2000 to 2017).  
1. Take-up Rates for Assignment Pay Incentives 
The top portion of Figure 1 is a graph that displays the total end strength on 
September 30th of each fiscal year from 2000 to 2017 as a reference point for the take-up 
rates for assignment pay incentives. The five take-up rates displayed on the graph by fiscal 
year are: Percent ACIP, Percent Fly Duty Total, Percent AIP, Percent Overseas Extension, 
and Percent SDA. The percentage for each pay incentive was calculated by dividing the 
total number of observations in each category (separated by fiscal year) by the total number 
of Marines at the end of each fiscal year, and multiplying by 100. Therefore, the numbers 
on the y-axis are already in percent form. There appears to be no correlation between the 
take-up rates for each assignment pay incentives and the sharp increase in end strength 
from 2000 to 2008 and the gradual decrease in end strength from 2008 to 2017. Figure 2 is 
a graph that displays the average annual dollar amount that the observations received at the 




Figure 1.  Total End Strength and Take-up Rate for Assignment Pay Incentives 
(2000–2017) 
 
Figure 2.  Average Annual Dollar Amount for Assignment Pay Incentives 
(2000–2017) 
In Figure 1, the take-up rates for ACIP and Fly Duty pay (crewmember and non-
crewmember rate) follow as similar pattern from 2000 to 2017. The take-up rates for both 
increased from 2000 to 2004, and they decreased gradually from 2005 to 2017. The take-
up rate for ACIP peaked by 2004 at 3.8% and decreased to 3.1% by 2017. The take-up rate 
for Fly Duty pay peaked by 2002 at .05% and decrease to .009% by 2017. The data suggests 
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that since both incentives are based on assignments and assignment policies in the aviation 
community, the take-up rates for both incentive pays would be proportional to each other. 
Marine aviators who fly the aircraft in an operational tour and collect ACIP at the DIFOP 
rate require the proportional amount of personnel assigned to support roles at the 
operational units in order to maintain operational capability for the aircraft. With the 
drawdown beginning in 2008, the percentage of Marines collecting these incentive pays 
decreased significantly.  
While the take-up rates have decreased gradually in both categories from 2004 to 
2017, the average dollar amount at the end of each fiscal year has slightly increased in the 
same time period. The average annual dollar amount in 2004 for ACIP was $4,413.17 and 
the average annual dollar amount in 2017 was $4,783.08. For Fly Duty pay, the average 
annual dollar amount was $932.48 in 2004 and increased to $1,035.94 in 2017. Since the 
maximum pay rates for both incentives have been the same from 2000 to 2017, the data 
suggests that Marines are incentivized to remain in operational assignments for a longer 
period of time throughout the fiscal year. A smaller percentage of Marine aviators are 
receiving ACIP by the end of each fiscal year, but they are incentivized to take operational 
assignments to receive ACIP at a higher rate (DIFOP). Although the take-up rate for Fly 
duty has decreased, the data suggests that crewmembers and non-crew members are 
incentivized to remain on fly duty orders for a longer duration throughout the fiscal year to 
receive more Fly Duty pay. 
The take-up rate for AIP increased from 2007 to 2008 and decreased from 2008 to 
2011. The increase in take-up rate from 0.16% of the Marine population 2007 to 0.33% in 
2008 appears to be a result of the numerous AIP programs available to Marines at the time: 
Deployment Extension Program, Recruiter Extension Program, Combat Extension 
Program, End Strength Incentive Program, Involuntary Extension Compensation Policy, 
and Operational Force Extension Incentive. Chapter III describes each of the programs in 
detail. The take-up rate decreased to 0.16% by the end of fiscal year 2009 as the majority 
of the programs ended and eventually fell to .00099% by the end of fiscal year 2011. The 
average annual amount remained steady from 2007 to 2009 at $1,257.17 and $1,244.80 
respectively, and then it increased to $4,570.00 in 2010. The increase in the amount in 2010 
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appears to be the result of the Combat Extension Program that ended by December 2010. 
The small percentage of Marines who participated in the program were in units that were 
involuntarily extended in a combat deployment, and the Marines voluntarily elected to 
extend their EAS for a specific number of months for the purposes of completing the 
deployment. The small percentage the Marines who received AIP by the end of 2011 
appear to be a result of being involuntarily extended beyond 365 days BOG in Iraq or 
Afghanistan at the rate of $1,000 per month for every month extended beyond the original 
12 months BOG.  
 The data show that from 2000 to 2014, the Marine Corps was entertaining few 
overseas extension requests under OTEIP. However, from 2015 to 2017, there was an 
increase in the take-up rate for overseas extension pay from 0.0016% to 0.0108%, 
respectively. Figure 2 also shows an increase in the average annual dollar amount that 
Marines received under the program for each fiscal year from 2015 to 2017. The average 
annual dollar amount increased from $422.20 in 2015 to $1,012.18 in 2017. The small 
average increase in this period in both the take-up rate on overseas extension pay as well 
as the amount in the period are possibly a result of projected shortages for the few hard to 
fill enlisted assignments overseas (not in a combat zone).  
Lastly, the take-up rate for SDAP has increased gradually by 3.5 percentage points 
from the end of fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2017. The take-up rate for SDAP increased 
from 4.403% in 2003 to 6.07% in 2008 as a result of the inclusion of MCT instructors and 
select assignments to MARSOC as part of the eligible population for SDAP. The increase 
of the take-up rate for SDAP from 5.63% in 2010 to 8.121% in 2017 appear to be a result 
of the increase in billets eligible for SDAP, such as the senior enlisted advisors to select 
commands and several other enlisted billet assignments. Of note, the average amounts at 
the end of each fiscal year for SDAP remained steady from 2004 to 2010 and began to 
decrease until 2017. In 2010, the average annual amount for SDAP was $3,181.96 and in 
2017, it fell to $1,972.25 per year. The data suggests that from 2010 to 2017, several 
updates were made to the SD levels (rates) associated with specific assignments. The data 
show an increase in the take-up rate of SDAP during this period at lower SD levels 
associated with those assignments.  
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2. Take-up Rates for Retention Pay Incentives by Skill 
Figure 3 shows the take-up rates for the retention pay incentives that target special 
skills and MOS’s. The retention pay incentives displayed on the graph are ACP, CSRB, 
FLPB, EBP, SRB, and CSB. Unlike the assignment pay incentives, there appears to be 
correlation between the increase in end strength from 180,252 Marines in 2006 to the peak 
in 2009 at 203,075 Marines and the increase in take-up rates in the same period for the 
retention pay incentives by skill. The take-up rates and the annual average dollar amounts 
appear to be increasing with end strength and decreasing with end strength with the 
exception of CSB. Figure 4 shows the average annual dollar amount for each of the 
retention pay incentives by skill at the end of each fiscal year. 
 




Figure 4.  Average Annual Amount for Retention Pay Incentives by Skill 
(2000–2017) 
The take-up rate for ACP from 2000 to 2005 remained steady at 0.8% and decreased 
by 0.76 percentage points to .026% by 2017. The ACP rates from the MARADMINs 
archived from 2003 to 2009 offered varying levels of ACP to eligible Marine aviators 
depending on platforms (rotary wing, fixed wing, and NFO) and length of contract (short 
term or long term). The rates during this period are displayed in Chapter III. Of note, the 
take-up rate for ACP decreased from 0.83% in 2003 to 0.67% in 2009, while the average 
annual amount at the end of the fiscal year decreased from $14,180.93 in 2003 to 
$12,627.64 in 2005 and increased again to $14,566.77 in 2009. The initial decrease and 
eventual increase in the average annual amount for ACP from 2003 to 2009 appear to be 
related to the differences in pay between platforms and length of contract. After 2009, the 
data suggests the decrease in take-up rate and average annual amount are associated with 
the decrease in the shortages projected for each of the aviation platforms.  
The snapshot at the end of each fiscal year only captured observations receiving 
CSRB in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. The spike in take-up rate from 0.0076% in 
2008 to 1.9% in 2009 was a result of the Captains’ Recognition Bonus Incentive in 2008 
that offered a $4,000 lump sum to captains in eligible MOS’s who agreed to extend their 
obligated service. The average annual dollar amount reflected in Figure 4 for the CSRB in 
in 2009 is $4,000. The data does not appear to capture the enlisted personnel from 2010 to 
2017, such as 0372s, who were also eligible for CSRB under certain conditions. 
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Figure 3 shows a gradual increase in the take-up rate for FLPB from 0.17% in 2006 
to 0.45% in 2013. The myriad policy changes during this period increased the accessibility 
of the DLPT to Marines who were eligible to take the test. In addition, Marines were 
incentivized with school seats as reenlistment incentives to the Defense Language Institute 
(DLI) and programs such as FAS and FAO. Figure 4 shows an increase in the average 
annual amount of FLPB in the amount of $1,427.60 by the end of fiscal year 2006 and 
$3,585.10 by 2007. The average annual amount from 2007 remained the same until 2013. 
The data suggests that a policy change in 2013, possibly MARADMIN 398/13 Update to 
Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus, may have caused an increase in the take-up rate in 
2014 as well as the decline in average annual amount for 2014. With the policy change, 
Marines were incentivized to perform better on the DLPT in order to be paid the same rate 
as they were under the previous policy. Marines who performed the same as they had under 
the old pay table, received a lower rate under the new table. Also, the data suggests a higher 
percentage of Marines took the DLPT in 2014 and high percentage of them qualified for 
the bonus at a lower rate. The take-up rate and the average annual amount returned to the 
same level in 2015 as they were in 2013, and both remained consistent at about the same 
level by the end of 2017.  
The take-up rate for the EBP and the SRB follow a similar pattern from 2000 to 
2017. Both appear to grow with end strength and decrease with end strength similarly. 
However, there are some differences. The take-up rate for EBP from 2000 to 2007 
remained consistent between 1.43% and 2.03% respectively, but the take-up rate for SRB 
decreased from 6.49% in 2001 to 2.08% in 2005 and then it increased to 8.11% in 2007. 
The policy changes beginning in 2004 established higher cap amounts for the SRBs 
available to specific MOS’s. The data suggests a possible correlation between higher take-
up rates in specific MOS’s with the higher cap amounts available for each fiscal year in 
those skills. The take-up rate for EBP peaked at the end of fiscal year 2008 at 5.95% and 
gradually decreased as end strength decreased to 0.19% by 2017. The take-up rate for SRB 
also peaked in 2008 at 8.29% and then decreased to 1.12% in 2017.  
An interesting observation in Figure 4 is that the average annual amount for EBP 
increased from $4,528.87 in 2008 to $7,558.73 in 2012 while the take-up rate during this 
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same period decreased. A possible explanation for this is that fewer Marines were taking 
the incentive in their initial contract for a special skill during this period, but the percentage 
of Marines who signed up for EBP were accepting contracts at a higher bonus rate. By 
2017, the annual average EBP amount decreased to $3,785.31. The annual SRB amount 
increased from $3,817.77 at the end of 2000 and increased to $27,969.15 by the end of 
2008. The annual SRB amount peaked at the end of fiscal year 2009 at $36,451.12 and 
gradually declined to $19,500.78 by 2017. The data suggests that after 2009, the Marine 
Corps targeted the high SRB rates to only specific MOS’s, which accounts for the gradual 
decrease in the take-up rate until 2017. The SRB kicker provided an extra incentive to 
Marines in Zone A to reenlist early.  
Lastly, the Figure 3 shows the increase in take-up rate for the CSB from 0.0006% 
in 2001 to .052% in 2004. As the Marine Corps began releasing MARADMINs cautioning 
Marines close to 15 years of service about the decreased defined benefit upon retirement 
at 20 years, the take-up rate decreased gradually to 0.009% by the end of fiscal year 2017 
when the option ended. As expected, the lump sum amount averaged at the annual rate of 
$30,000. The purpose of the CSB was a retention tool for the Marine Corps to keep special 
skills and experience past 15 years of service. It also saved the government money by 
offering a defined benefit plan at the end of 20 years of service at a decreased rate.  
3. Take-up Rates for Pay Incentives Incident to Involvement in Special 
Activities  
Figure 5 displays the take-up rates for pay incentives incident to involvement in 
special activities. This category reflects small percentages of the Marine population who 
are eligible for requesting these pay incentives that are retroactive in nature. The Marines 
must show proof of their assignment or involvement in an activity or incident in order to 
be compensated monetarily. The take-up rates and average annual amounts for ACCEL 
pay, additional uniform allowance, assisted living allowance, and HFP do not appear to 
show any correlation to changes in end strength. Figure 6 shows the average annual amount 
the observations received by the end of each fiscal year for each pay incentive.  
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Figure 5.  Total End Strength and Take-up Rate for Pay Incentives Incident to 
Involvement in Special Activities (2000–2017) 
 
Figure 6.  Average Annual Amount for Pay Incentives Incident to Involvement 
in Special Activities (2000–2017) 
At the end of fiscal years 2000 and 2001, the take-up rate for ACCEL pay was 
0.0006%. In 2004 and 2005, the take-up rates increased to 0.001% for both years. In 2011 
and 2017, the take-up rates were 0.0005% and 0.001% respectively. Observations were not 
captured at the end of fiscal years 2002 to 2003, 2006 to 2010, and 2012 to 2016. The 
average annual amount for ACCEL pay ranged from $7.58 in 2001 to a peak amount in 
2004 at $2,064.17. The flat rate for ACCEL pay is $150 per month, but if a Marine does 
not complete a full month assigned to the duty, he or she is entitled to a prorated amount. 
The proration explains the varying amounts in the average annual calculations. Also, the 
small percentage of Marines the ACCEL pay incentive could potentially affect are the ones 
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who are selected to attend the Navy’s Test Pilot School in Maryland (subject to school seat 
availability each fiscal year).  
 The take-up rates increased for the additional uniform allowance from 2000 to 
2003 from 0.91% to 1.58% respectively. During the same period, the average annual 
amounts increased from $602.15 to $713.59. However, from 2004 to 2013, the take-up 
rates for the incentive decreased from 1.4% to 0.85%, and at the same time the average 
annual amounts increased from $1,250.67 to $3,078.36. The data suggest that fewer special 
duty assignments qualify for receipt of an additional uniform allowance, and there may be 
a reduce rate of approvals for commands requesting additional uniform allowances for their 
Marines. In addition, from 2004 to 2013, the data suggests that the percentage of Marines 
who received an additional clothing allowance were receiving it at a higher rate than the 
previous years. From 2014 to 2017, the take-up rate for the additional uniform allowance 
increased slightly from 0.78% to 0.89%. The average annual amount decreased from 
$2,572.53 in 2014 to $1,682.56 in 2017. The data suggest that the approval rate for 
additional uniform allowances is determined on a case by case basis and is dependent on 
how much funding is available for additional uniform allowances for each fiscal year.   
The data show an increase in the take-up rate for the assisted living allowance from 
the establishment of the program in 2011 until 2013. The take-up rate grew from 0.002% 
in 2011 to 0.008% in 2013. The take-up rate decreased from 0.006% in 2014 to 0.002% in 
2016 and then back up to 0.004% in 2017. These percentages captured Marines who were 
catastrophically injured in an incident and who applied for the allowance. The average 
annual amounts ranged from $488.78 in 2011, peaking at $9,491.71 in 2014, and then 
decreasing to $5,681.38 by 2017. 
 HFP is also an incident-driven pay incentive that is retroactive in nature. The 
difference is that it is not a prorated amount. Marines can be eligible for a full $225 per 
month if they are only involved in a hostile enemy incident for one day. The data suggest 
that from 2000 to 2012, most hostile enemy incidents were covered by blanket SECNAV 
memorandums authorizing IDP in those designated areas. Therefore, the data would not 
capture these incidents as HFP as they are coded in MCTFS as IDP at the prorated amount 
of $225 per month. From 2013 to 2017, Figure 5 shows an increase in the HFP take-up rate 
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from 0.024% to 0.073%. Although the data appears to show an increase in enemy action 
incidents, the policy change under PAC in 2010 allowing injured Marines to request 
continuation pay for entitlements and has increased the number of Marines eligible to 
collect HFP for 12 months or more after the hostile fire incident. Figure 6 shows that from 
2013 to 2016, the average annual amount for HFP increased from $225 to $709.86, and the 
average annual amount decreased to $354.04 in 2017. The data suggests that some Marines 
under PAC continued to receive HFP across fiscal years due to qualifications of being 
severely injured.  
4. Take-up Rates for Pay Incentives Affecting Enlisted Personnel and 
Pilots 
Figure 7 shows the combined take-up rates for SRB, SDA, Additional Uniform 
Allowance, AIP, and EBP as they are incentives that primarily target the retention of 
enlisted personnel. The take-up rates for each of the categories of pay incentives primarily 
affecting enlisted personnel are mutually exclusive. For example, the percentages of 
Marines who collected SDA pay are not part of the population of Marines who collected 
SRB. The same applies for the other pay incentives in Figure 7. The graph is helpful in 
making several observations. First, at the end of fiscal year 2008, about 22% of the entire 
Marine population was in receipt of an enlisted pay incentive as the total end strength was 
reaching its peak within the 2000 to 2017 period. Second, as the take-up rates for the SRB 
decreased slightly from 2011 to 2017, the take-up rates for SDAP increased slightly during 
this same period. Also, Figure 8 shows that average annual amounts for each of the pay 
incentives on the same graph. A glaring observation is that the average amount for the SRB 
is much higher at the end of each fiscal year than any of the other pay incentives. This 
suggests that the Marine Corps is willing to pay higher retention bonuses to keep specific 
skills and experience in certain MOS’s among enlisted personnel.  
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Figure 7.  Total End Strength and Take-up Rate for Pay Incentives Affecting 
Enlisted Personnel (2000–2017) 
 
Figure 8.  Average Annual Amount in Dollars for Enlisted Pay Incentives 
(2000–2017) 
Figure 9 shows the take-up rates for the two pay incentives that affect the aviation 
community: ACIP and ACP. The data suggests that between 2001 and 2008 the aviation 
community experienced an increased amount of take-up rates for ACIP compared to 2009 
to 2017. This observation makes sense given the operational tempo in the Marine Corps 
from 2001 and 2008 – Marine aviators were fulfilling requirements in support of OEF, OIF 
and in garrison. Therefore, more of them were able to maintain continuous or conditional 
ACIP. The average annual amount for ACIP remained relatively consistent from year to 
year in Figure 10. Figure 9 shows the gradual decreasing take-up rate for ACP from 2005 
to 2017, suggesting the decreased shortages in retention for pilots. Moreover, Figure 10 
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shows the steep decline in average annual amounts for ACP from 2012 to 2017 suggesting 
the same observation also suggesting a decrease in the need to retain aviators across all 
platforms. 
 
Figure 9.  Total End Strength and Take-up Rate for Pay Incentives Affecting 
Pilots (2000–2017) 
 
Figure 10.  Average Annual Amount in Dollars of Aviation Pay Incentives 
Affecting Pilots (2000–2017) 
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B. FLPB PROGRAM REVIEW 
The purpose of the program review is to provide insight on the effectiveness of the 
FLPB as a pay incentive for Marines to perform at or above the minimum Interagency 
Language Roundtable (ILR) of 2 on the three subtests of the DLPT. An ILR of 2 is the 
minimum required score in all three subtests (reading, listening, and speaking) in order for 
the score to count towards eligibility for the FLPB. In this section, I use the dataset of 
663,866 Marines with foreign language codes at the end of each fiscal as well as the end 
strength totals from DMDC for the end of each fiscal year for the analysis. The foreign 
language codes in MCTFS are the result of the self-reported screening process at accession 
by which Marines (both officers and enlisted) officially report the language or dialect of 
skill in their records. If the language or dialect is not one of the recognized languages or 
dialects in MCTFS, the Marines are still reported in this population as a language or dialect 
skill of “unknown.” However, all languages or dialects that are tested on the DLPT are 
recognized languages in MCTFS. The foreign language code also captures the population 
of Marines who are in a career field associated with foreign language proficiency.  
1. Background
After conducting the thorough analysis of the literature review available regarding 
the FLPB in the Marine Corps as well as the data analysis for take-up rates and average 
annual amounts for the FLPB from 2000 to 2017, I identify the two population target 
groups for the FLPB. The first population of the Marines are those who are skilled in a 
language or dialect and possess a language skill recorded in MCTFS at accession. Figure 
11 is a visual depiction of a Marine (regardless of rank, billet, or MOS) who has a foreign 
language code in MCTFS and has the incentive to take the DLPT and score at or above 
ILR 2 on the subtests.  
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Figure 11.  FLPB Incentive Chart—Any Marine 
As depicted on the flow chart, Marines who possess a language or dialect skill in 
either Category A or Category B are incentivized to perform at an ILR 2 level on the 
subtests or better in order to qualify for a higher monthly rate of the FLPB each month for 
the whole year. The languages listed as Category A languages designated as “Immediate” 
or “Emergent” on the Strategic Language List (SLL) vary from year to year and are 
maintained and updated at USD (P&R) for official use only. In addition, the Marine Corps 
Language List that supplements the “Enduring” languages on the SSL in Category B are 
also maintained at USD (P&R) and DIRINT for official use only. An important distinction 
between Category A and Category B is that the DoD sets the pay rates for Category A 
languages and does not allow the services to alter them. However, the DoD authorizes the 
Marine Corps is to set the rates for languages in Category B.  
The second population of Marines that the FLPB appears to target are the Marines 
who possess a PMOS, AMOS, or BMOS that requires them to maintain a level of 
proficiency in a language. Figure 12 is a flow chart the depicts the incentive for Marines 
designated as career linguists to perform at or above the ILR 2 level on the DLPT subtests 
in order to meet the minimum requirement to qualify for a bonus in Category A or Category 
B. The Marine Corps designates the languages for career linguists as “prevalent in force” 
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Figure 12.  FLPB Incentive Chart—Career Linguists 
DIRINT is the authority for designating languages as “prevalent in force” in 
Category A or Category B and distributes the lists for official use only. By looking at both 
flow charts, the languages designated as “prevalent in force” are restricted to only Marines 
with a PMOS, AMOS and BMOS. MCO 7220.52F explains certain exceptions that 
Marines may request FLPB payment when scoring at an ILR level 1 in a Category A or 
Category B language. Those exceptions include Marines who request FLPB after scoring 
at an ILR 1 level who are temporary assigned to special mission units that may require use 
or proficiency of a specific language or dialect. When the Marine Corps restricts “prevalent 
in force” languages and associated pay schedules to only career linguists over time, the 
shift may affect Marines’ performance on the DLPT. The incentive becomes much stronger 
for the Marines who possess the billet to perform better on the DLPT than for Marines who 
possess a language proficiency skill and who are not in a language proficiency associated 
billet. Therefore, the eligibility restriction for the FLPB by billet for “prevalent in force” 
languages gives less incentive for Marines with the language skill and not in a billet to 
perform well on the DLPT. Only Marines in the billet are incentivized to perform at a ILR 
2 level or above on the DLPT subtests in order to qualify at the higher rate on the payment 
schedule. 
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2. Motivation and Initial Observations from the Data
Figure 13 is the graph that shows the average annual amount for Marines receiving 
the FLPB at the end of each fiscal year. As identified earlier, 2014 was an odd year in 
which the dataset did not capture Marines receiving the maximum annual amount for the 
FLPB of $12,000 for multiple languages, which pulled the average below the average range 
from fiscal year 2007 to 2013 and 2015 to 2017. MCO 7220.52F sets the maximum amount 
for the FLPB to $12,000 annually for Marines who meet the maximum scores on the DLPT 
in three different languages.  
Figure 13.  Average Annual Amount of FLPB by Fiscal Year (2000–2017) 
Figure 14 is a holistic view of the population in the Marine Corps at the end of each 
fiscal year who have a foreign language code in MCTFS. The foreign language code is an 
identifier of the Marine population at these points in time that either self-reported a 
language skill in MCTFS at accession or possess a language skill by PMOS, AMOS, or 
BMOS. The increase from 2003 to 2017 are likely the result of the policy in 2003 that 
required foreign language skill screening at accession.  
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Figure 14.  Percentage of Marine Population with a Foreign Language Code by 
Fiscal Year (2000–2017) 
In addition, in 2012 the Marine Corps implemented the Regional, Culture, and 
Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program to provide officer and enlisted development in 
culture language skills. The program is a career-long program that is a PME requirement 
for each grade for Marines above the rank of sergeant. Officer and enlisted Marines are 
incentivized to score a ILR level 1 on the DLPT to fulfill the language requirement for the 
program. After the RCLF program was implemented, the foreign language code population 
became a mix of Marines with foreign language skills reported at accession, Marines who 
are in a PMOS, AMOS, and BMOS with a foreign language skill, and Marine officers and 
enlisted personnel above the grade of sergeant. The data suggests the large percentage 
increase in the Marine population after 2012 who has a foreign language code in MCTFS 
is associated with the implementation of the RCLF Program.  
Figure 15 is a closer look at just the Marine population with a foreign language 
code by fiscal year. The figure shows close to 50% of the Marine population with a foreign 
language code in MCTFS took the DLPT. Of the same population of Marines with a 
language code in MCTFS, the percentage of Marines with a MOS qualifying language 
grew from .041% in 2008 to 3.15% in 2017. The data suggests an increase in the growth 
of school-trained career linguists from 2008 to 2017.  
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Figure 15.  Percentage of Marines with a Foreign Language Code Who Took the 
DLPT and Percentage of Marines with a Foreign Language Code Who Have 
a Language MOS (2000–2017) 
3. Methodology 
In an attempt to isolate the effect of the FLPB as a pay incentive to perform well 
on the DLPT, I restrict the population of Marines to those who met the IRL 2 level in any 
one of the three subtests of the DLPT. Top portion of the graph in Figure 16 is the 
percentage of the entire Marine population who had a foreign language code in MCTFS at 
the end of each fiscal year. The bottom graph shows the percentage of Marines out of the 
foreign language code population who scored at the IRL 2 level or above in any one of the 
three subtests on the DLPT. In 2009, of the population of Marines with a foreign language 
code, 26.7% scored at the IRL 2 level. In 2013, the percentage decreased to 21.7%, and 
then it increased back to 25.2% in 2017.  
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Figure 16.  Marines with a Foreign Language Code Who Scored IRL 2 or above 
on the DLPT (2000–2017) 
As suggested from the literature available, there are three main sources of initial 
motivation to take the DLPT for the FLPB. The first is due to a Marine’s exposure to a 
language or dialect through a home environment or upbringing. The second source of 
motivation to take the DLPT is due to a PMOS, AMOS, or BMOS incident to formal 
training in a military source, such as DLI. The third source of motivation to take the DLPT 
for the FLPB having had experience in studying abroad or in a formal civilian institution. 
These types of motivational sources are depicted in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17.  Performance of Marines Who Took the DLPT by Source (2000–
2017) 
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The three graphs are the breakdown of the percentage of the foreign language code 
population who scored at the IRL 2 level in at least one of the 3 subtests on the DLPT by 
source. The data suggests that from 2009 to 2017, the FLPB has been incentivizing more 
Marines from the military source to perform better on the DLPT. In 2009, of the population 
of Marines with a foreign language code who scored at the IRL 2 level or above, 3.4% 
were from a military source, and by 2017, the percentage grew to 19.7% of the Marine 
population with a foreign language code. However, of the population of Marines with a 
foreign language code, the percentage from the home environment source decreased from 
23.3% in 2009 to 5.41% in 2017. 
Since the literature suggests that “prevalent in force” languages may be associated 
with some of the higher rates of incentive pays, which are restricted to Marines in a PMOS, 
AMOS, or BMOS, I estimate the partial effects of the military source variable on the 
probability if scoring at an IRL 2 level of above on the DLPT. The treatment group are 
Marines who tested on the DLPT and were trained in a military source. The control group 
consists of the Marines who tested on the DLPT and were trained in the language from a 
home source or civilian source. By using 284,305 observations from 2000 to 2017, I used 
a logistic regression to estimate the partial effects of the military source variable on scoring 
an IRL level of 2 by using the following equation: 
 
Pr (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷_𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡2𝑖𝑖=1) = F( 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚_𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚_𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)  
 
Figure 18 is shows the output tables for the logistic regression and the partial 
effects. On average, of the population of Marines who tested on the DLPT, the percentage 
of Marines who perform at or above the IRL 2 level in at least one of the three subtests is 
9.6% less than those who came from a home source or civilian source. 
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Figure 18.  Output Tables for Logistic Regression 
4. Findings from the Program Review 
The data suggest several takeaways. First, as the policies began to restrict the 
eligibility of payment of the FLPB to Marines in a PMOS, AMOS, or BMOS, Marines who 
were trained in a language from a home environment had less incentive to maintain a 
proficiency level and score an IRL 2 on the subtests. Fewer of these Marines decided to 
take the DLPT and perform well because they would not be paid for their performance in 
a language skill that was restricted to just Marines who had a PMOS, AMOS, or BMOS 
with a prevalent in force language. Second, the Marine Corps has been directing the FLPB 
as an incentive to Marines who have a PMOS, AMOS, and BMOS. Since 2009, they have 
been performing better, but on average, the percentage of Marines from the military source 
who have scored IRL 2 or above on the DLPT has not yet exceeded percentage of Marines 
from the home or civilian source who have performed at the IRL 2 level since 2009. The 
latter finding suggests the importance of immersion in language skills. The consistent 
immersion in a home environment or even studies abroad has a higher impact on the 
maintenance and retention of language proficiency skills that are limited with classroom 
instruction through time.  
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5. Chapter Summary 
The data analysis and the program review for the FLPB, provide further insight into 
the changes in the policies for the special pay incentives that targeted retention through 
assignments, retention through special skills, and participation in special programs offering 
retroactive compensation. The graphical depiction of the take-up rates and the average 
annual amounts for each pay incentive highlight periods from 2000 to 2017 where incentive 
levers started and stopped in order to fill projected shortages associated with assignments 
and special skills throughout the Marine Corps. Furthermore, the program review 
highlights how FLPB potentially affects performance on the DLPT and why sustained 
language immersion may be a way to optimize return of investment in the FLPB program.   
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis explores the economic theories surrounding labor demand in the 
Department of Defense and discussed several studies related to retention through 
assignments in specific career fields, retention incentives for special skills, and 
development of incentives to promote language skills. Chapter III provides the summary 
of 15 pay incentives available to Marines from 2000 to 2017 in three categories: incentives 
for assignments, incentives for retention, and incentives incident to involvement in special 
activities. The chapter also provides the comprehensive list of all the references 
documenting pay changes for each of the incentives to direct future research on pay 
elasticities. Chapter IV includes the data analysis of all 15 pay incentives as well as a 
program review for the FLPB. Through the in-depth analysis of the references surrounding 
the pay incentives and the thorough analysis with the available data, there are several 
conclusions from this study. 
A. MAJOR TAKEAWAYS FROM THE DATA ANALYSIS 
Since the drawdown in end strength beginning in 2008, the take-up rates for 
retention incentives for assignments decreased in the aviation community for both officers 
and enlisted personnel assigned to fly duty. However, the average annual dollar amount 
from 2008 to 2017 has gradually increased for both ACIP and fly duty pay. The data 
suggests that pilots who have remained on active duty are incentivized to take operational 
tours to qualify for the DIFOP rate for a longer duration, and the enlisted personnel eligible 
for assignment to fly duty are also incentivized to volunteer for a longer duration to collect 
higher amounts for fly duty pay throughout the year. 
In addition, the take-up rates for overseas extension pay and SDAP has gradually 
increased since the drawdown.   During this period, the average annual amounts at the end 
of each fiscal year in overseas extension pay have increased significantly while the average 
annual amounts for SDAP has decreased gradually. The data suggests the increased 
average annual amount in overseas extension pay could potentially be a result of having to 
pay Marines more to extend in hard-to-fill billets overseas, especially if the Marines are on 
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unaccompanied tours (assignments that do not permit the accompaniment of dependents to 
the duty location). The data suggests that the decrease in the average annual amount for 
SDAP could be a result of the addition of more assignments eligible for SDAP at lower SD 
rates.        
B. MAJOR TAKEAWAYS FROM THE PROGRAM REVIEW FOR FLPB 
The take-up rates for incentive pays targeting special skills have decreased since 
the drawdown except for FLPB. Although there are a small percentage of Marines who 
qualify for the FLPB each year, the data suggests the growing importance of language 
proficiency skills as a strategic capability not only for those Marines in billets that require 
language proficiency skills, but also for the rest of the Marine population.   
However, the data in the program review suggests an interesting phenomenon when 
attempting to measure the effects of the FLPB as a pay incentive on performance on the 
DLPT by source of skill (military institution, home environment, and civilian institution). 
As DLI began to develop their programs for teaching language skills, restricting the FLPB 
to Marines holding a PMOS, AMOS, and BMOS in specific languages, and testing Marines 
for their proficiency on the DLPT in those languages, the Marine Corps effectively 
removed its ability to measure the true effect of the FLPB on performance on the DLPT. 
After languages became restricted to billet holders over time, the measurements on how 
well Marines were performing on the DLPT as a result of the FLPB became just measuring 
the treatment effect on the treated in the restricted languages. Since the languages that 
became restricted through time varied from year to year and were not available to the 
public, it is not clear which languages became subject to the Hawthorne effects since 2009. 
Career linguists began to increase their proficiency in their designated languages because 
performance on the DLPT became a performance measurement for both career linguists 
and training instruction at military institutions. The data suggests the increase in the 
population from military sources who performed well on the DLPT after 2009 could be a 
result of positive incentives from the FLPB, incentives for promotion, or reinforcement 
from training instruction at the military institutions for the DLPT. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASED RETURN OF INVESTMENT 
AND FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Currently, the Marine Corps could improve efficiencies on the FLPB and the 
maintenance of language proficiency skills by allowing more time for Marines in the FAO 
and FAS programs to remain immersed in their respective language environment, 
especially because language proficiency skills are perishable through time. This would 
mean that a Marine could stay in a specialized track that would take him or her out of a 
PMOS longer but still remain competitive with peers for promotion. The tradeoff is that 
the Marine Corps would be able to maintain a sustained capability in prevalent in force 
languages that is more comparable to home source training. Some areas where the 
assignment of Marines could grow to increase the return on investment in the FLPB 
program could be placing Marines on SDA at embassy duty or recruiting duty by language 
proficiency skill.  
This study lays out the groundwork for the calculation of pay elasticities in 
associated with the categories of pay with larger variation in the data from 2000 to 2017. 
Some areas where there may be enough variation in the data are the incentives that affect 
enlisted personnel, such as EBP, SRB, and SDA. The pay data in this study is an 
underestimate for the special pays affecting enlisted personnel because they capture the 
take-up rates only for the end of the fiscal year. Marines who reenlist in Zone A are 
encouraged to do so early as they compete for limited boat spaces in their respective MOS 
and their “no later than” reenlistment dates are normally close their pay entry base dates 
(date they accessed). Therefore, the pay data in this study does not capture the majority of 
the Marines who reenlisted halfway through the fiscal year. When requesting cross-
sectional data through TFDW, I recommend capturing snapshots at the end of each quarter 
throughout the fiscal year to give a better estimate of the population receiving the pay 
incentives.    
I recommend exploring categories of incentive pays that were not mentioned in this 
analysis as they were not captured in the data available: officer accession incentive (OAI), 
accession bonuses for the warrant officer Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), jump pay 
(parachute duty), demolition duty (for EOD), dive pay (mainly affecting Marines in 
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reconnaissance MOS’s). Many of these bonuses were drawn during the increase in end 
strength.    
Lastly, I recommend that the Marine Corps begin the planning for the development 
of the CSRB as a way to retain personnel in special skills and maintain healthy levels of 
experience and quality beyond 12 years of service. The planning would require an 
extensive look at the wage differentials between the MOS and a comparable occupation in 
the civilian sector. In cases where the wage differential may be too extreme for military 
compensation due to the high market rates in the civilian sector, the Marine Corps may 
have to gain flexibility in shaping an attitude and culture within certain communities that 
can make up for limitations in pay incentives in order to affect retention, maintain quality, 
and sustain experience past 12 years of service.    
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